Stoic Ethics by Stephens William O.;

Author:Stephens, William O.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Published: 2011-04-05T04:00:00+00:00

C. Human affection and feeling

Epictetus believes that loving concern for others is inherent in (non-pathological cases of) human nature. He asserts that humans are by nature noble, have a sense of shame, and that it is our nature to subordinate pleasure to the virtuous performance of our social duties. Benevolent impulses, according to him, naturally override our desire for pleasure

… in the case of the human being (anthrōpos), it is not his material substance that we should honour, his bits of flesh, but the principal things (ta proēgoumena). What are these? The duties of citizenship, marriage, begetting children, reverence to god, care for parents, in a word, desire, avoidance, choice, refusal, the proper performance of each one of these acts, and that is, in accordance with our nature. And what is our nature? To act as free people (eleutheroi), as noble, as self-respecting. Why, what other living being blushes, what other comprehends the impression of shame? And it is our nature to subordinate pleasure to these duties as their servant, their minister, so as to arouse our interest and keep us acting in accordance with nature. (3.7.25–8)

Here Epictetus infers from the empirical observation that only human beings blush and feel shame that our nature as human beings is to esteem the noble, respectable performance of all our human roles as citizens, spouses, parents, worshippers of god, children, etc. Because of our instinctive response to feel shame and blush when we know that we are acting disgracefully, he argues that respectable, virtuous action arises quite normally from our basic human nature. Thus he even asserts that it is in accordance with our human nature to subordinate pleasure to the proper performance of our social roles.9 Therefore, Epictetus reminds us that when abroad, the intention of the traveller who is just passing through is not to stay permanently at a nice inn and selfishly indulge in the amenities of a temporary lodging, but rather

… your plan (prothesis) is the other thing, to return to your country, to relieve the fear of your kinsmen, to do the duties of a citizen yourself, to marry, bring up children, hold the customary’ offices. For you did not come into the world to select unusually fine places, I expect, but to live and go about your business in the place where you were born and were enrolled as a citizen. (2.23.38–9)

He asserts we are by nature born communitarian (phusei koinōnikoi gegonamen) (2.20.13). Furthermore, since we do in fact have this natural fellowship (koinōnia), he urges that we ought by all means to guard it (2.20.8). In support of this assertion he cites the inconsistency of Epicurus’ actions. Epicurus denies that there is a natural fellowship among rational beings on the one hand, yet he exerts much effort writing books and trying to persuade people that he is right on the other hand (2.20.6–14). But if he believes what he says, why should he worry about people being deceived about this matter and why would he bother

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